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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee/Cross Appellant Richard S. Hart ("Mr. Hart") concurs with
Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in finding that Salt

Lake County voluntarily and knowingly waived and abandoned any defenses
it may have had based upon governmental immunity?
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion.
2.

Assuming, arguendo,

that Salt Lake County did not waive any

defenses it may have had based on governmental immunity, did the Trial
Court abuse its discretion in finding that Salt Lake County failed to
introduce evidence to prove the discretionary function exception?
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion.
3.

Did the Trial Court err in concluding that Salt Lake County

owed a duty of care to Mr. Hart with respect to the design,
construction and maintenance of Wasatch Boulevard?
Standard of Review: Correctness of law.
4.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying Salt Lake

County's untimely motion for new trial, based upon, among other things,
its failure to comply with U.R.Civ.P. 59(c)?
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion.
5.

Did the Trial Court err in concluding that the holding in

Keegan v. State

of Utah,

896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995) did not represent a

change in the law sufficient to support Salt Lake County's Motion for
Relief from Judgment?

1

Standard of Review: Correctness of Law.
6.

Assuming, arguendo,

Salt Lake County's Rule 59 motion was not

procedurally defective, did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in
permitting Mr. Hart to summarize his medical expenses and the general
nature of his settlement with co-defendant Robert E. Tweedy in argument
at trial?
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion.
7.

Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in refusing to

submit the issue of Mr. Hart's comparative fault to the jury, where
Salt Lake County stipulated pretrial to the exclusion of Mr. Hart from
the special verdict form and where no evidence existed to support a
finding of fault?
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion.
8.

Did the Trial Court err in applying the Damages Cap found in

Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-3 0-34, where Salt Lake County knowingly waived
and abandoned any defense it may have had based on governmental
immunity?
Standard of Review: Correctness of law.
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 1157-74, 1214-16,
1460-62).
9.

Does application of the Damages Cap found in Utah Code Ann.

Sec. 63-30-34 violate Mr. Hart's constitutional rights?
Standard of Review: Correctness of law.
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 1157-74, 1214-16,
1460-62).

2

10.

Did the Trial Court err in excluding pre-judgment interest,

post judgment interest and costs from its award of damages in the
Judgment on Verdict in a Civil Action?
Standard of Review: Correctness of Law.
This issue was preserved for appeal at (R. 1157-74, 1214-16,
1460-62).
DETERMINATIVE LAWS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Const. Art. I, Sees. 1, 7, 11 and 24

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-34(l)(b)

Utah Cons. Art. V

Utah Code Ann. §78-27-44

Utah Const. Art. VI, Sec. 26

Utah Civ. 8(c)

Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4(2)

Utah R. Civ. 12(h)

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3

Utah R, Civ. 59

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-4

Utah R. Civ. 60(b)

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-8

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Mr. Hart concurs with Salt Lake County's

Nature of the Case, except that it should identify the accident
location as Wasatch Boulevard, Salt Lake County, Utah, and state Salt
Lake County owned Wasatch Boulevard at the time of the accident and for
more than 35 years prior thereto.

Further, Mr. Hart alleged Salt Lake

County was negligent in failing to design, engineer and construct
Wasatch Boulevard.
B.

(R. 1101)

Course of Proceedings.

Mr. Hart concurs in Salt Lake County's

statement of the Course of Proceedings, except as follows:
Salt Lake County's Reply Memorandum regarding its Motion for

3

Summary Judgment (R. 42 0) dropped the governmental immunity argument.
Salt Lake County did not raise or argue the immunity defense at the
time of oral argument on the motion (R. 498-511) and, knowingly
abandoned the immunity argument at such hearing.

(R. 508). Salt Lake

County did not raise or argue the immunity defense thereafter. (R.
1452-1459).
At an August 23, 1994 pretrial conference in camera, Salt Lake
County informed the Trial Court there was no evidence of comparative
fault against Mr. Hart. (R. 1454, 2386).
Mr. Hart opposed Salt Lake County's Motion to Limit the Amount of
Judgment (R. 1157-74) and submitted a form of judgment, which included
interest (pre-judgment and post judgment) and costs.

(R. 1214-1216).

The September 7, 1995 Order included findings conclusions regarding
comparative fault and waiver of governmental immunity, among other
things.

(R. 1452-1459).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Mr. Hart's Amended Complaint alleges Salt Lake County was

liable for injuries suffered in a December 24, 1986 traffic accident on
Wasatch Boulevard, a Salt Lake County owned and maintained highway. (R.
79-90) .
2.

In its Answer, Salt Lake County raised the defense of

governmental immunity as affirmative defense (R. 102, 107).
3.

On December 12, 1991, Salt Lake County filed a Motion for

Summary Judgment on three specific grounds:
(2) negligence, and (3) causation.

(1) governmental immunity,

(R. 290, 293, 296-300). In

4

response, Mr. Hart filed an opposing memorandum, arguing governmental
immunity was not available.

(R. 363, 369-376).

County abandoned the immunity argument.
4.

In reply, Salt Lake

(R. 420-429) .

During the March 9, 1992 oral argument, Salt Lake County

abandoned its immunity defense, and argued that the negligence of
Robert E. Tweedy was the sole cause of Mr. Hart's injuries.

(R. 508-

509) .
5.

In entering an April 13, 1992 Order that Mr. Hartfs injuries

were solely caused by Mr. Tweedy, the Trial Court did not reference the
abandoned immunity argument.
6.

On May 1, 1992, Mr. Hart appealed (R. 490-491), the Court of

Appeals reversed and remanded.
7.

(R. 488-489).

(R. 514).

In subsequent proceedings, Salt Lake County did not raise or

preserve the governmental immunity defense. (R. 967-1030).
issues of duty, negligence and causation were
8.

.

Only the

(R. 1452-59).

At the August 23, 1994 pretrial conference in camera, counsel

for Salt Lake County indicated they had no evidence of comparative
fault against Mr. Hart and acquiesced in striking Mr. Hart from the
Special Verdict form.
9.

(R. 2385, 2386).

On September 2, 1994, a $1,33 0,000 verdict was entered for

Mr. Hart, finding Salt Lake County's comparative negligence to be 51%.
(R. 1139-40).
10.
Action.

Mr. Hart submitted a form Judgment On Verdict In Civil
(R. 1214-1216).

On September 13, 1994, Salt Lake County moved

to limit the Judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-34.

5

(R. 1152).

11.

On December 6, 1994, the Court granted the Motion.

(R.

1207), and on January 24, 1995, entered a Judgment for $250,000,
excluding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and costs.

(R.

1263) .
12.

In its February 1, 1995 Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding

the Verdict, Motion for New Trial, and Motion for Remittitur (R. 1267),
Salt Lake County failed to raise governmental immunity and, although it
raised comparative fault, it argued only that more fault should have
been attributed to Mr. Tweedy, not to Mr. Hart.
13.

(R. 1269-1282).

A supporting affidavit was not filed within twenty days of

Salt Lake County's filing of its Motion for New Trial.

The Affidavit

of Michael E. Postma was not filed until March 3, 1995.

(R. 1303).

14.

On September 7, 1995, the Court entered a Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Order denying the motion and ruling Salt Lake
County knowingly waived its immunity defenses.

(R. 1452-1459).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Salt Lake County is not immune from suit because of the statutory
waiver of immunity and its own express waiver and abandonment of any
immunity defense it may have had.

Even if Salt Lake County had the

right to argue governmental immunity, it failed to introduce any
evidence in support of such a defense.

The record does not support a

finding of discretionary function immunity.

Salt Lake County owed a

duty of care to Mr. Hart with regard to the design, construction and
maintenance of Wasatch Blvd.

Salt Lake County is not entitled to

relief from the jury verdict because its post-trial motions were

6

properly denied by the Trial Court.
Imposition of a damages cap violated Mr Hart's constitutional
i: ights and :i mpropei I > den i ei :i I I:

• •' •'": •

I I i L: t: I n t e r e s t ai id CM : >sts

A^gyMgNT
I.

SALT LAKE COUNTY IS NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR ITS NEGLIGENT FAILURE
TO DESIGN, CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN WASATCH BOULEVARD IN COMPLIANCE
WITH INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND IN A REASONABLY SAFE CONDITION,
A.

The Utah Legislature Has Expressly Waived Governmental
Immunity For Injuries Arising Out of Defective, Unsafe Or
Dangerous Conditions On Highways.

1\\*

(iurl.iiiH

of common law m

i n iV(-j i i i m e i i t d .1

lit

iimniuinly

he Suate of i: ^1 .

775 P.zu 3 4 n , 34s vut:av- ; u P :

luii

Condemarin

I n n q «\>:.isled

v.

a

University

ii iiiiiii il t e r

Hosp.,

Following the enactment of* the Utah

Governmental ,mmunity Act in 1966, Utah Code Ann. Sec. bJ JU I, et.
seq,

szhe

"Act"), a "governmental entity performing governmental

functions was immunized from suit under the general grant of immunity
contained in Section 63-30-3 " McCorvey
Transi
grant

8^« P.2d 41,

(Utah 1993)

v

™--?^ State Dept. of

Notwithstanding this general

I
l iminumly, I In-1 llldli SI dl, <•'" Legisla*

injuries caused by "defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any
highway, road
Ann.

or other structure located on them."

§63-30 8 (1953, as amended)-

Utah Code

-Immunity is specifica] 1 v waived

for all governmental entities . . .

(4) for defective highways.

bridges, and other structures . . . . "

7

Condemarin

<' 'r P "Ml at 350

(emphasis added)-1
The jury concluded that "Salt Lake County was "negligent in
performing . . . one or more of the specific acts of negligence alleged
by the Plaintiff."

(R. 1139).

Plaintiff's claims of negligence

included (1) failure to properly design, engineer and construct Wasatch
Boulevard, (2) failure to install adequate protective devices and
features, including appropriate escape lanes, and (3) negligent
maintenance of Wasatch Boulevard in a dangerous and hazardous
condition.

(R. 1101).

Obviously, Salt Lake County's liability arises

out of circumstances for which there has been a specific statutory
waiver of immunity.

As discussed, infra,

consistent with Salt Lake

County's express waiver of governmental immunity, Salt Lake County did
not introduce any evidence to rebut the statutory waiver of immunity or
to prove the performance of a discretionary function.
B.

Contrary To The Argument Of Salt Lake County, Governmental
Immunity Is An Affirmative Defense, Which Is Subject To
Waiver.

Salt Lake County contends that governmental immunity is not an
affirmative defense and can be raised as a jurisdictional issue at any
time.

This argument is a feeble attempt to avoid the fatal effect of

(i) the County's voluntary waiver and abandonment of any defense
relating to immunity in the proceedings below and (ii) its failure to
1

Utah's Governmental Immunity Act provides both for the general grant of governmental immunity, and for the
waiver thereof, in 1983, the legislature amended the Act, albeit arbitrarily and discriminatorily, to limit the waiver of
immunity by capping damages recoverable from the government at $250,000. See Utah Code Ann. §63-30-34. This
demonstrates the government's power to waive immunity and to modify that waiver as it sees fit. See Hansen v. Salt Lake
County, 794 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah 1990) ("the Act was structured such that immunity was granted generally and waived..
. specifically.").

8

introduce evidence o r argument i n the pretrial o r trial p r o c e e d i n g s
w i t h respect t o t h e "discretionary function" exception t o t h e w a i v e r o f
:

s. at 3 1 I .] ; e

3 : i u L1 .5 m . i staken] y i el i es i t;poii an i napplicable line

of federal cases that do not apply to an analysis of state governmental
immunity

Utah and other state courts have repeatedly held that

sovereign minimi i I "„" i s iin af f iinirit ive deterihi „ .illiiii 1 nii"l I K 1 a s s e i f e d
and proved to be effective.

Ironically, Salt Lake County ignores its

own repeated reference to governmental immunity as an affirmative
defense. 2
Utah appellate courts agree that governmental immunity is an
"affirmative defense" and s subject to waiver.
through

Stuckmai

-..* . Lake

City,

In Nelson

by and

919 P. 2d 568, 574 (Utah 1996)

(citations omitted

*:he U t a h Supreme Court u n a n i m o u s l y held,

11

<:

•

n: ni n :i :i 1 5

defendant."
App

II 9 94)

:i s
See

-i\. s\. ' .,i

u-., e n s e wh i c 1 1 mu s t b e p r o ve d b> t he

*State

of Utah,

882 P.2d 1150, 1160 (Utah

(Bench, J „, concurring in result), citing

Feree,

784 P.2d

149, 152-53 (Utah 1989) ("Sovereign immunity, however, is an
affirmative defense'. . .

); and Ambus v

U tah State

Bd. Of

Educ,

For example, in its February 13, 1989 Answer, Salt Lake County raised the
Governmental Immunity Act as its "Fourth Defense". (R. 107). Salt Lake County
even admits that it "raised governmental immunity as a defense" in its answer.
(Applt. Brief at 5). At the hearing on its Motion for Summary Judgment, Salt Lake
County's attorney responded affirmatively when asked by Judge Sawaya if he was
"abandoning the Immunity argument". (R. 508). In its Reply Memorandum dated June
16, 1995, Salt Lake County argued, "[e]ven if the County waived its immunity
defense . . ." (R. 1412) and specifically referred to its "immunity defense"
elsewhere in its memorandum. (R. 1407, 1409). On the basis of Salt Lake County's
abandonment of the defense and given its failure to introduce evidence or argument
in the trial proceedings, the Trial Court ruled Salt Lake County's "affirmative
defense" had been waived, abandoned and not pursued at trial. (R #1453, 1456,
2376).

9

858 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1993) (Qualified immunity is an affirmative
defense).

Recognition of immunity as an affirmative defense implicitly

recognizes that immunity may be waived.
It is settled Utah law that affirmative defenses can be waived
under a variety of circumstances.3

Salt Lake County's assertion that

"this issue is one of first impression in Utah" cannot be taken
seriously.

The sole Utah case cited by Salt Lake County to support its

position is easily distinguished because it dealt solely with the
notice requirement of the Act.

Nielsen

v. Gurley,

888 p.2d 130, 134

(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Other state courts are in agreement with the Utah position that
governmental immunity is an affirmative defense, which is subject to
waiver.

In Davis

v. City

of San Antonio,

752 S.W.2d 518, 520 (Tex.

1988), the court found that the City of San Antonio failed to raise
governmental immunity as a defense until after the case was tried, and
held: "the City waived any immunity defense by failing to affirmatively
plead it."

Id.

at 523. The Davis

court also rejected the same

argument advanced by Salt Lake County in this appeal that governmental
immunity presents a subject matter jurisdiction question:
We do not read our opinion in Duhart

as holding that the trial

See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) (if a party fails to plead an affirmative defense
when required to do so, the defense is waived); Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h) (failure to
raise most non-jurisdictional defenses constitutes waiver); State v. Perank, 858
P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted) ("Res judicata is an affirmative
defense . . . and therefore is waivable."). Federal cases construing Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(c) are consistent. See Moore's Federal Practice,
§#8.27 [3] (Supp. 1996) ("party
who should have pleaded the defense is precluded from introducing evidence in
support of it, or receiving a jury instruction concerning the defense, and the
court cannot decide the case on the basis of that defense").

10

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction . . .and that any
judgment . . .would have been void. We further perceive no
unfairness in requiring governmental units to plead their immunity
in order to avoid liability on that ground.
We conclude
that sovereign immunity may not be asserted as a jurisdictional
obstacle to the trial court's power to hear cases against
governmental defendants.
Id.

at 520.

•'; int- ^,..iorado i.'ouM
County

of Denver,

i i v" "llf Center f

^ *

I /IppeaJi; agree,'.!.
: -

'*-••?*•

- • and

(Colo. App. 1988), plaintiff sued the

i io- r^ hiring of police officers

At trial,

after the City had mistakenly concluded it was insured aga-:•::>•u

plaintiff's claims, counsel conceded in oral argument
I.- e.

[i]f the jury

Valdez was assaulted and battered, the City,

by its pleadings has already agreed to pay his damages. . . ."
395.

at

Mr. Valdez argued that the City's concession constituted a waiver

oi the sovereign immunity defense. Agreeing n

' Mi

I'alde,,, " 'u \?s/d-

court applied garden variety waiver analysis to the governmental
defense: "Waiver is a voluntary abandonment or surrender by
competent persons oi a right known to exist. . . . Liai
where immunity has not been raised as a defense by a public entity
."

Id.

T!

-.1 ,

circumstances at issue,

these statements, together with the City's limited assertion of
immunity were sufficient to constitute an express waiver of sovereign
immunity as a defense t r \IMJIJH(1

I I J J HI

As discussed in Section I.C., infra,
between Valdez

. . . „"

the factual similarities

din I I h< i tu l dtil n;ase are ^1 ill \\n\
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id.

li I ] : • : tl i ::ia ses, the

government's express waiver of immunity was made by counsel in oral
argument. (R. 1456).
with Valdez

The Trial Court's holding in this case squares

and is consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in

Numerous other state courts are in accord.4

Nelson.

Salt Lake County's reliance upon a line of cases analyzing
discretionary function immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act
("FTCA") is misplaced and misleading.

The argument does not apply to

this Court's analysis of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

Salt Lake

County has not and cannot cite Utah case law in support of its
position.

The interpretation by federal courts of defenses under the

FTCA is limited to an analysis of immunity under the FTCA.

Even other

federal court decisions which have considered the nature of the
immunity defense in contexts other than the FTCA have ruled that
immunity must be raised or it will be waived.5
Salt Lake County's argument, that governmental immunity should not
be construed as an affirmative defense on the basis of selected federal

4

See City of Dallas v. Cox, 793 S.W.2d 701, 728 (Tex. App. 1990) (When answer of governmental defendant is
stricken as a discovery sanction, one of the consequences is waiver of defense of governmental immunity); Ramirez v.
City ofRedondo Beach, 229 Cal.Rptr. 917,922 (Cal. App.1986) (Immunity is an affirmative defense to liability for the
dangerous condition of public property and must be pleaded and proved by the public entity); Jackson v. City of Kansas
City, 680 P.2d 877, 886 (Kan. 1984) (Burden is on the governmental entity to establish governmental immunity); Scovill
v. City ofAstoria, 878 P.2d 1127,1128 (Or. App. 1994) ("It is the city's burden to establish immunity, not plaintiffs to
negate it."); Gibson v. City of Grand Rapids, 412 N.W.2d 658, 659 (Mich. App. 1987) ("'Immunity granted by law' is an
affirmative defense which must be raised in the governmental agency's responsive pleading."); McCummings v. Hurley
Medical Center, 446 N.W.2d 114,117 (Mich. 1989) (Governmental immunity treated no differently from any other type
of immunity; must be pled as an affirmative defense); Stryker v. City ofAtlanta, 738 F. Supp. 1423,1431 (N.D. Ga. 1990)
(Purchase of liability insurance waives sovereign immunity to the extent of the insured amount).
5

Notably, the Trial Court's decision is in keeping with long-established law. See Chrysler Corp. V. United
States, 190 F. Supp. 412,414 (E.D. Mich. 1960) (held affirmative defense waived, where "defendant did not address itself
to this issue, and a t . . . oral arguments,... expressly stated that it wished to withdraw the defense"); Walsh v. Mellas, 837
F.2d 789, 799 (7th Cir. 1988) F.O.P. Lodge No. 121 v. City ofHobart, 864 F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1988); Maul v.
Constan, 928 F.2d 784, 785 (7th Cir. 1991).
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court decisions, even ignores a recent observation in AIG
Insur.

Srvcs.,

19^b;

Inc.

v. United

The AIG court stated,

States,

Aviation

885 F. Supp. 14 96, 1503 (D. Utah

[d]espite Die : iiiuidiii les LII language

between the state and federal [FTCA] discretionary function exceptions,
t

Interpreted differently "

Sa] t Lake

County's suggestion that this court should disregard well-settled state
law in favor of an inapplicable line of federal cases is without merit.
C.

Salt Lake County Specifically And Voluntarily Waived And
Abandoned Any Litigation Defense Relating To Governmental
Immunity

Salt Lake County argues its open court waiver ot

Hit*

immunity

defense should be deemed ineffectual on appeal on the basis that such
waiver was allegedly not an intentional, unequivocal relinquishment of
the defense.

In support, Salt Lake County has selectively cited only

five lines from the record

(R. 508-09).

Salt Lake County's failed to

advise this Court of the full context of the Court's direct question
regarding abandonment.

Comments made by counsel for Mr. Hart

specifically addressed Mr. McKnight's decision not to raise the
i

irinui i .' 'i

liefense

«

'.'id."

u i M iriii i :

<!, J Trip ha s i R a d d e d ) :

I would understand from the argument that the issues with
reference to the immunity defense are not being pursued. 1
believe there's an express waiver of immunity in this case. If
Your Honor has any questions about that, I would be happy to
answer that
(

Coi i s l d e i a t i oi I : -f t h e fi ill 1 coi i t e x t • : f tl: le e xcl lange giv es

proper emphasis to counsel's affirmative abandonment of "the immunity
argument."

(R. 508). It is axiomatic that counsel of record has

authority to bind his client based upon statements, admissions or
arguments advanced on the record.
This Court should also note that while Salt Lake County has
downplayed the foregoing exchange, its in-court abandonment of the
immunity defense occurred after it had briefed the discretionary
function issue. (R. 296-300).

Salt Lake County did not address

immunity in its reply, nor did it refer to immunity at oral argument,
and made the express waiver noted above.6

In course, Salt Lake County

did not raise or argue an immunity defense in its motion for new trial.
When the issue was raised for the first time during belated postjudgment proceedings, the Trial Court found (R. 1453-54) and ruled Salt
Lake County's conduct constituted a waiver of the defense (emphasis
added):

Salt Lake County voluntarily and knowingly waived and abandoned
any defenses it may have had based on governmental immunity by (1)
abandoning the defense in open court during argument on
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, (2) failing to raise the
issue of governmental immunity in any subsequent argument, motion
or pleading to the court, and (3) failing to introduce evidence on
the issue of the discretionary function exception during the trial
of the case.
(R. 1456).

Having expressly waived any defense based upon governmental

immunity, Salt Lake County cannot now, on appeal, be heard to argue for
the application of the discretionary function exception to the waiver

6

During a post-trial argument regarding the intent and effect of Mr. McKnighfs verbal waiver of the immunity
defense, the Trial Court stated its belief that "[i]t seems unequivocal to me that he was relinquishing, knowingly
relinquishing any right he may have to raise that issue
" Mr. Holden, subsequent counsel for Salt Lake County,
acknowledged the Court's analysis by responding, "I agree that there should have been - [he] probably should not have
done what he did
And prior counsel, he should have probably not done that." (R. 2376-77).
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doctrine.
D.

Salt Lake County Failed To Introduce Evidence At Trial In
Support Of A Governmental Immunity Defense.

Consistent with its open court waiver thereof, Salt Lake County
failed to introduce any evidence at triaj
function exception.

• <=

- • * \-;: y

Salt Lake County openly concedes the absence of

evi dence at 1 t; : i all • : • i: 1 1 i , • • : i i t. i < : a] defense issue.7

Thus, even

the defense were available, Salt Lake County's failure to introduce
evidence at trial precludes it from raising the defense on appeal.
; ,

;- i .

- A f- . r-

< Tosh Kano

as "evidence" as we] ] as its extensive post-trial argument to the Trial
Court based solely upon Mr. Kano's inadmissible statements, beg the
entire issue.

. a fact,

* ^meuib uiciw

*--.».

::

- -: L : ;i-

were obviously available to Salt Lake County during trial, and its
failure to introduce the same corroborates the Trial Court's finding w*.
waiver.
Failure to introduce evidence or argument at the time of trial
coi icer n :i i lg a u I affirmative defense legally bars the assertion thereof in
post-trial proceedings. 8

Salt Lake County introduced absolutely no

In its brief, Salt Lake County acknowledges only the post-trial "affidavit of Tosh Kano specified the
discretionary nature of the act or omission in widening Wasatch Boulevard". Further, Salt Lake County argues that "the
failure to raise immunity before and during trial" does not constitute a waiver. (Applt. Brief at 38-39). Salt Lake County
has likewise argued that its "failure to raise the issue at trial" was justified. (Applt. Brief at 38). It is not surprising that
Salt Lake County did not propose and the Court did not give a jury instruction relating to the discretionary function
analysis. (R. 967-1033,1079-1134).
8

See Turtle Mgt, Inc. v. Haggis Mgt, Inc., 645 P.2d 667,672 (Utah 1982) (where defenses in answer, but no
argument was made to trial court, Supreme Court "will not consider on appeal issues which were not submitted to the trial
court and concerning which the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact or law."); Bangerter
v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983) ("defenses and claims not raised by the parties in the trial cannot be considered
for the first time on appeal."); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah App.1987) (theory not permitted on appeal
because trial court made no ruling about the issue, appellant made no objection to the omission, and appellant attorney's
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evidence or argument at trial with respect to a defense based upon the
discretionary function exception. Applt. Brief at 8-11, 14-16, 39; R.
967-1033; R. 2388-90, 2398; See also,
1452-59)•

Findings and Conclusions (R.

Having failed to preserve this issue, Salt Lake County

cannot now assert the same on appeal.

1.

The Trial C<?vrt Difl NQt Abuse Its piggr^tipn Xn Striking The

Untimely. Post-Trial Affidavit Of Tosh Kano.

In connection with its

post-trial decision to belatedly raise the discretionary function
exception, Salt Lake County realized that it had introduced no evidence
at trial respecting any immunity defense.

To overcome this defect,

Salt Lake County improperly attempted to submit the post-trial
affidavit of Tosh Kano.

Salt Lake County concedes that Tosh Kano's

belated affidavit comprises its sole direct evidence of "the
discretionary nature of the act or omission in widening Wasatch
Boulevard."

(Applt. Brief at 39).

As evidenced by the Trial Court's

Findings & Conclusions, this post-trial submission of evidence was
properly stricken. (R. 1452-59).
The affidavit of Tosh Kano was filed May 1, 1995. (R. 1350).
Despite Salt Lake County's characterization, this affidavit was not
evidence at all.

In addition to being conclusory, self-serving and

otherwise inadmissible in form, the statements were neither introduced
as evidence to the jury, nor subject to the cross-examination.

The

mere mention of the term "mortgage" twice in lower proceedings did not raise the issue to a "level of consciousness such
that the trial judge can consider it."). See also Zions First Afar/7 Bank v. Nat'l American Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651,657
(Utah 1988); LeBaron & Assoc, Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc., 823 P.2d 479,482-83 (Utah App. 1991); and Dansie v.
Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155,1158 n.9 (Utah App. 1994).
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affidavit has never become part of the trial record,

Notably, Salt

Lake County has not and cannot claim newly discovered evidence.
I'uUIIUi

¥ ,<!i
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Mr.

t .1 1 1 I I I ""

I n

call Mr. Kano supports the ruling of waiver.
Clearly, Mr. Hart's June 1, 1995 objection to the "after-the-fact"
affidavi t was timely c

on October i.

l"»"i"'l|( (Mi

Hail aJju tiled a MoLion

to Strike Affidavit of Tosh Kano restating that it was irrelevant and
inadmissible

1528-30)

Mi

111.ml .ml Fin stated,

Salt Lake County's persistence in arguing that its post-trial
submission of the Affidavit of Tosh Kano (i) is unrebutted,
and (ii) establishes the basis for this Court's conclusion
that Salt Lake County's misconduct herein was a discretionary
function, is incredible. Such evidence is not admissible at
this late stage of the proceeding and is merely an ill-fated
attempt to preserve a record for appeal.
(R. 155 0 .

5aJx

Lake County's reference to an untimely objection by

Mr. Hart mischaracterizes of the record.
E.

The Discretionary Function Exception Does Not Apply.

Assuming, arguendo,

that Salt Lake County did not waive its

governmental immunity defenses, an analysis of the

record

shows that

the discretionary function exception in §#63-30-10(1) does not apply
because Salt Lake County's negligence is operational, not
discretionary.
Decisions of the type sheltered by the ''discretionary function"
exception are those decisions made at "the basic policy making level."
Bi ge 1 c i;

Ingei

sol 1,

618 I 2 el 5 0 , 5 3 (lit al I 1 9 8 0)

I" 11 e s e tle c i s i o 11 s

would include, for example, whether to build a highway at a general
location as opposed to decisions regarding the plans, specifications

and supervision of the actual construction work.

The Bigelow

court

stated:
Although the acts of the state involved in designing [a] traffic
control system involve some degree of discretion, as do almost all
acts, the design of the traffic control system does not involve
the "basic policy making level."
Id.

Quoted with approval in Keegan

1995).

v.

State,

896 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah

Imposing liability upon the state where it "created a dangerous

condition by the design of [a] highway project," the court in Andrus
State,

v.

541 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Utah 1975) (emphasis added) similarly

stated:
The decision to build the highway and specifying its general
location were discretionary functions, but the preparing of plans
and specifications and the supervision of the manner in which the
work was carried out cannot be labeled discretionary functions.
The line between decisions protected by the discretionary function
exception and decisions not so protected has "been consistently drawn
between those functions ascribable to the policy making level and those
to the operational level."
667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983).

Little v.

Utah State

Div.

Of Famiily

Serv.,

Once the state attempts to raise its

immunity shield, "it must make a showing that a conscious balancing of
risks and advantages took place" with respect to the particular action
or forbearance in question.

Id.

(Emphasis added).

According to the

Little court, "[t]o be purely discretionary, an act by the state must
be affirmed under four preliminary questions:"
(1) Does the challenged act, omission or decision
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, program or
objective?
18

(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential
to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program
or objective as opposed to one which would not change the
course or direction of the policy, program, or objective?
(3) Does the act, omission or decision require the exercise
of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the
part of the governmental agency involved?
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the
requisite, constitutional, statutory or lawful authority and
duty to do or to make the challenge to act, omission, or
decision?
Id.

On the record, the Trial Court., uoul.fi noL appjy I he discieLionary
function exception even if Salt Lake County would have preserved the
defense,

Keega n provided helpful assistance ::i n approaching the

analysis of this issue by indicating that the distinction between
discretionary and non-discretionary decisions is more on "the basis of

the execution of already-formulated policies."

Id.

at 623

In this case, Jury Instruction No, 3 3 incorporated Utah Code Ann.
§ •".

' properly stated Salt Lake County's cii ity to c ;:: in tpj } •

with the AASHTO standards of design and construction where it was
performing ''construction" work on its roadways.

(R. 1103-113 0)

By

contrast, and according to the same jury instruction, Salt Lake County
had no ciiity to comply with AASHTO when performing "maintenance" work,
i ric] ud :i i lg the making of w any new roadbed either t »y additior ' > existjr
systems or relocation.7'

(R

noQl

n

v contrast, the definition of

"maintenance" work includes the grading or widening of an existing
yinpfrved road ,

(R

ll II Il 0) .

The evidence included the testimony of Bruce Reading, a licensed
professional engineer, who testified that Wasatch Boulevard, at the
site of the accident, had been widened by 6 feet prior to the accident.
(R. 1668-1669).

In accord with Jury Instruction No. 31, AASHTO

guidelines applied to the design and construction of Wasatch Boulevard.
Mr. Reading further testified Wasatch Boulevard was unsafe, defective
and non-compliant with AASHTO requirements.
1676).

(R. 1666, 1671-1673,

Mr. Reading's opined the negligent and defective condition of

Wasatch Boulevard contributed to the accident.

(R. 1677).

The statutory decision to comply with AASHTO for all
"construction" work on highways, constituted a "basic policy-making
level" decision as to what standards would govern highway construction.
Salt Lake County's decision to widen Wasatch Blvd. prior to Mr. Hart's
accident was also discretionary under this test.

However, having made

that decision, Salt Lake County's actions in performing construction
work (i.e., the method of construction design, etc.) included
operational decision making in compliance with objective, easily
understood, AASHTO standards.

In this regard, Salt Lake County's

activities are very similar to the design of the traffic control system
in

Bigelow.
Keegan makes it clear that the governmental entity seeking the

protection of discretionary function immunity carries the burden of
evidencing it was engaged in basic policy making decisions, and that
the suit for negligence attacks those discretionary activities.
624.

Id.

The Little court reached the same conclusion in requiring "a
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at

showing that a conscious balancing of risks and advantages took place."
Little,

667 P.2d at 51.

In this case, there was absolutely no evidence

offered to prove such a conscious balancing occurred.

Salt Lake County

failed to carry its burden.
By contrast, in Keegan,

the state introduced testimony from the

UDOT safety studies engineer (Art Guerts) and the specific project
design engineer (Alex Badaliam) who provided testimonial and
documentary evidence of the complicated and numerous basic policy
decisions and processes that were involved.

The studies were extensive

and the decision to proceed in the construction project was made at a
policy level.

In this case, Salt Lake County failed to introduce any

evidence of the decision making process. Notably, Tosh Kano, who
produced the post-trial affidavit now relied upon by Salt Lake County,
did not testify.
This record cannot demonstrate any attempt by Salt Lake County to
carry its burden of proving that the discretionary function exception
is applicable under these circumstances.

The jury was correct in

finding that Salt Lake County was negligent in its design, construction
and maintenance of Wasatch Blvd. and that such negligence caused Mr.
Hart's injuries.
P.

Keegan v. State Of Utah Did Not Change The Law Of
Governmental Immunity In The State Of Utah And Does Not
Provide Grounds For Relief From Judgment.

Citing Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7), and claiming Keegan is
dispositive, Salt Lake County seeks relief from the verdict.

While

acknowledging that the Utah Supreme Court had not addressed the
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question,9 Salt Lake County contends any "change in law" justifies
vacating the judgment under Rule 60(b)(7) based upon its interpretation
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), an analogous federal rule.10 First,
Keegan does not represent a change in the law.

Second, even if it did,

careful review of the authorities cited demonstrates that a simple
change in law is not a sufficient basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

jEeegai? Refrffjnngfl anfl Clfrrified Prior PsQipipnal fr^w in Utfrht

1.

Salt Lake County's argument that it should be relieved from judgment
focuses on what it perceives to be a change in the law created by
Keegan.

This argument exposes Salt Lake County's misunderstanding of

Keegan.

A review of Keegan and prior case law shows the error of Salt Lake
County's position.

This question involves the interplay between Utah

Code Ann. §#63-30-8 and §#63-30-10(1) and the applicability of
discretionary function exception set forth in §#8 prior to the 1991
amendment to that section.

See Mr. Hart's argument, supra,

The first analysis of this question is found in Velasquez
Pacific

Railroad

Co.,

469 P.2d 5 (Utah 1970).

at 9, n. 1.
v.

Union

In Velasguez, the court

held that the discretionary function exception found in §#10(1) applied
to negligence cases arising under a §8 waiver of immunity.

After

applying a discretionary function analysis, the court held "the State
of Utah is excepted from the waiver of immunity from suit ..." Id at 6.
A year later, the Supreme Court reviewed a nuisance case which
9

See Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 252 P.2d 205,207 (Utah 1953).

10

The federal counterpart to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7) is Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
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also alleged that immunity had been waived under §#63-30-8.
v. University

of Utah,

Sanford

In

488 P.2d 741 (Utah 1971), the court held that

the discretionary function exception of §#10(1) did not apply to a
nuisance action alleging waiver under §#8.
Sanford

Id.

at 745. Although

is clearly distinguishable from the holding in Velasquez,

it

did give rise to some confusion in subsequent opinions construing §#8
See Bigelow,

and §#10.

618 P.2d at 53 and Richards

v.

Leavitt,

716

P.2d 276, 278 (Utah 1986).
Despite the apparent confusion in Bigelow
Velasquez

and Leavitt, the

holding has never been overruled or eroded.

Of particular

significance to Salt Lake County's position is Duncan v. Union
Railroad

Co.,

842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992).

Pacific

That Salt Lake County

completely ignored Duncan in its argument is understandable given
Duncan's

clear reaffirmation of Velasquez.

plaintiff's contention that Velasquez

After analyzing the

should be overruled as a result

of subsequent opinions, the Duncan court held:
We reaffirm our holding in Velasquez that the duties imposed upon
UDOT in these particulars are truly discretionary functions and
are therefore protected by governmental immunity.
Our decisions in Bigelow
City . . . , and Richards
holding in
Velasquez.

Id.

v.
v.

Ingersoll
Leavitt

. . . , Bower v.
Riverton
. . ., have not eroded our

at 835.
Therefore, even if same confusion had existed previously, the

state of decisional law in Utah was clear in April, 1992 under Duncan.
Velasquez

was still the law and §#63-30-8 was subject to the
23

discretionary function exception set forth in §#63-30-10(1).

The fact

that Duncan was decided more than two years prior to the trial in this
action is fatal to Salt Lake County's position.
Moreover, the opinion in Keegan leaves no room for argument.
Supreme Court did not consider Keegan to be a change in the law.

The
To

the contrary, in reviewing prior case law, the Keegan court
specifically references Duncan and concluded:
In summary, we note that Velasquez was this court's earliest
statement on the application of §63-30-10 to §63-30-8, and it has
never been definitively overruled or limited. Velasquez
is also
the most recently reaffirmed approach by this court. See id.
Furthermore, the Velasquez rule not only comports with our prior

case law, but makes sound decisional genge ag wellId.

at 623 (emphasis added) . A reading of Keegan permits only one

conclusion: it did not change prior law; it affirmed it.
Even if Keegan represented a change in law, that it fail as a
basis for Salt Lake County's Rule 60(b) motion, federal courts
addressing the issue recognize the general rule that a mere "change in
law" is not grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).

Relief under Rule

60(b)(6) may be granted only in "extraordinary circumstances", and a
change in law alone is not an extraordinary circumstance.

Salt Lake

County has misstated the law on this issue, has failed to discuss the
"extraordinary circumstances" test under Rule 60(b) (6)11, and has

Notably, Salt Lake County omits any reference to authority establishing this rule. In observing the foregoing
general rule, Wright & Miller refers to the case of Louche v United States, 21 F.R.D. 305 (S.D. N.Y. 1957) (emphasis
added), which held: "[0]nly where the total record portrays extraordinary circumstances ... may a party who failed to
appear or appeal resort to the extreme remedy afforded by Rule 60(b)(6).... But this rule was not... intended to invest the
court with an omnipotence whose boundary is defined only by the court's conscience.... [T]he courts have enunciated the
dual proposition that Rule 60(b)(6) is not a substitute for appeal and that resort to the rule in order to obtain relief from a
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omitted any mention of the leading cases establishing the Tenth Circuit
law on whether a change of law is basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
The leading Tenth Circuit case is Pierce
In Pierce,

F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975).
hit by a shipper's truck.

v.

Cook & Co.,

Inc., 518

one plaintiff was injured when

The driver's claim was removed to federal

court, where the driver's claims were dismissed under an Oklahoma state
court decision that relieved the shipper of liability for the acts of
independent contractors.

The second plaintiff, a passenger, also sued

the shipper, but avoided removal.

The passenger succeeded in having

the Oklahoma Supreme Court overrule the decision under which the driver
lost her suit, an option unavailable to the driver herself.

The driver

filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate the judgment due to the change
in law.

Noting that "[a]n adjudication must at some time become

final," the Tenth Circuit stated the general rule that relief from
judgments under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in "extraordinary
situations," and "'a change in the law or in the judicial view of an
established rule of law is not such an extraordinary circumstance which
justifies such relief.1"
Wichita,
motion)).

Id.

at 723 (quoting Collins

v. City

of

254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958) (denying Rule 60(b)(6)
The Pierce

court distinguished Pierce

from Collins

and

concluded extraordinary circumstances existed.12

judgment is not justified merely because the judgment is erroneous or because the decisional law has been changed bv a
subsequent ruling." C. Wright & A. Miller\ Federal Practice and Procedure, §2864 (Supp. 1994).
In Collins, the change in law occurred in a wholly unrelated case and the Tenth Circuit held that a mere
change in law was not extraordinary enough to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6). In contrast, the change in law in Pierce
"aros[e] out of the same accident as that in which the plaintiffs now before us were injured." Additionally, the driver
would not have been able to obtain the reversal of the Oklahoma decision in federal court. The Tenth Circuit held:
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Although the Tenth Circuit granted relief due to a change in law
under Rule 60(b)(6) in Pierce,
Pierce

is understandable.

Salt Lake County's decision not to cite

Pierce

demonstrates that Salt Lake County's

stated basis for relief under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(7) is anything but
"extraordinary."

Compared to the unusual facts in Pierce,

Salt Lake

County's basis for relief is premised upon a simple change of law in a
wholly unrelated action.

Salt Lake County does not cite Pierce

because

its request for relief does not survive the comparison.
Salt Lake County relies on Metz

Smith

N.C.,

v.

Merrill

Lynch,

39 F.3d 1482, 1491 n.9 (10th Cir. 1994).

Pierce,

Fenner

While Metz

acknowledges that a Supreme Court decision may warrant Rule 60(b)(6)
relief, no Supreme Court decision is implicated in this case. Salt
Lake County's statement that the Tenth Circuit recognizes such
decisions as warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief is both irrelevant and
incorrect.

This is particularly evident when the entire text of

footnote 9 to the Metz opinion is reviewed.
Unlike each case cited, Salt Lake County neither asserted the
subsequently changed law (i.e., governmental immunity defense), nor
obtained a determination under the prior state law.

The issue of

governmental immunity was never decided by the Trial Court; rather,

The unusual combination of events which have occurred make the situation extraordinary. The federal
courts in which plaintiffs were forced to litigate have given them substantially different treatment than
that received in state court by another injured in the same accident.
Id. Obviously, the situation in the present case is much more similar to Collins than to Pierce. However, as noted above,
Keegan, did not change Utah law.
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&

Salt Lake County simply abandoned the defense.

Moreover, Keegan does

not change the law, and arises in a wholly unrelated case, after the
law of this action was determined and a verdict rendered.

Even if

Keegan is thought to make a change in law by clarification, it does not
rise to the standard required to support the relief requested by Salt
Lake County.13
II.

SALT LAKE COUNTY OWED A DUTY OF CARE TO MR. HART TO DESIGN,
CONSTRUCT AND MAINTAIN WASATCH BOULEVARD IN A SAFE CONDITION, FREE
FROM DANGEROUS DEFECTS OR HAZARDS.
Utah law has long-recognized that governmental entities owe a duty

of reasonable care to the motoring public regarding the maintenance and
operation of their various highway systems.

"Generally, a municipality

has *a non-delegable duty to exercise due care in maintaining streets
within its corporate boundaries in a reasonably safe condition for
travel . . . . ' "

De Villiers

v.

Utah County,

(Utah App. 1994) (citations omitted).14

882 P.2d 1161, 1166-67
As a governmental entity,

Salt Lake County owed a duty of reasonable care to Mr. Hart in its
design, construction, maintenance and operation of Wasatch Boulevard.

Unlike the facts in Keegan, Salt Lake County failed to present any evidence regarding the factual
underpinnings of an immunity defense. No testimony whatsoever was introduced regarding accident/safety studies,
County analyses of safety and budgetary concerns, delays or inconvenience or other planning considerations. Indeed, the
"after-the-fact" Affidavit of Tosh Kano begs the entire question.
u

See Bramel v. Utah State Road Comm w, 465 P.2d 534, 536 n.3 (Utah 1970) (acknowledged state's "duty to
exercise reasonable care in keeping highways in a safe condition for travel."); Murray v. Ogden City, 548 P.2d 896, 897
(Utah 1976) (charged city "with a non-delegable duty to exercise due care in maintaining streets and sidewalks . . . in
reasonably safe condition for travel") and Carroll v. State Road Comm w., 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972) (acknowledged
state's duty to provide reasonably adequate means of advising or protecting the public regarding dangerous conditions)
and cases cited. Authorities similarly recognize that "[o]ne who undertakes . . . to render services to another... is subject
to liability to the other f o r . . . his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 323 (1979).
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It is curious that Salt Lake County now argues it had no duty.

In a

post-trial memorandum, Salt Lake County admitted it "had a duty to
exercise due care in maintaining Wasatch Boulevard in a reasonably safe
condition for travel."

(R. 1270).

Consistent with the jury

instructions proposed by Salt Lake County and given by the Trial Court,
this duty includes (i) w[compliance] with the design and construction
standards currently adopted by the AASHTO" (R. 1027, 1109-10); and (ii)
the "exercise [of] due care in maintaining Wasatch Boulevard in a
reasonably safe condition for travel" (R. 1028, 1108).

The Trial

Court's instructions also included duty to use reasonable care "to
design safe highways and maintain its highways in a reasonably safe
condition. (R. 1102, 1107).15

In its closing argument, Salt Lake

County even noted, "[t]he duty owed by [Salt Lake County] to the
plaintiff is a duty to exercise due care in maintaining Wasatch
Boulevard in a reasonably safe condition for traffic."

(R. 2341) .

Salt Lake County's reference to the public duty doctrine on appeal
is misplaced.

First, Salt Lake County failed to plead or adequately

address this defense at trial. Until well after the close of evidence.
Salt Lake County did not assert the affirmative defense in its Answer
(R. 102-10) and did not raise it during trial.

Salt Lake County even

In Instruction No. 23, the Trial Court advised the jury of Mr. Hart's claims of negligence and instructed that
"[t]o return a verdict for the plaintiff, you must find . . . [t]he defendant was negligent in one or more of the [five]
particulars alleged
" (R. 1101). In light of the verdict, Salt Lake County 's self serving and limited characterization
of the jury's finding of liability clearly ignores the record. In its brief, Salt Lake County notes that it objected to
Instruction No. 23 on the basis of lack of evidence. This objection was overruled by the Trial Court presumably in light
of the unrebutted testimony of, inter alia, Bruce Reading (R. 1677-78,1695) and Mr. Hart (R. 1809-14,1890-91,189495,2279-80). Salt Lake County's post trial assertion of the public duty doctrine is irrelevant.
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proposed duty instructions at odds with its argument on appeal,16
Second, and more importantly, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled the
public duty doctrine does not apply under the these circumstances.
Trapp v. Salt

Lake City

Corp.,

In

835 P.2d 161 (Utah 1992), the Utah

Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment and held that a municipality
owes an injured person a duty to maintain a sidewalk in a reasonably
safe condition despite the absence of a "special relationship."

The

Trapp court stated:
[These] special relationship cases . . . have no application
to the present case . . . . In the special relationship cases,
people, not physical facilities, are the things that must be
"controlled" if a duty exists. . . The present case does not
involve the duty to control an independent actor; rather, it
involves a duty to maintain physical facilities.
The duty to maintain physical facilities, or more
specifically, to keep sidewalks and streets in a reasonably safe
condition, was first enunciated in Scott v. Provo City, 14 Utah
31, 45 P.1005 (1895), and was most recently endorsed in Ingram v.
Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987). (citations omitted).
For almost a century, Utah statutes have implicitly recognized
this duty by conferring on persons who have been injured or
damaged from a defective sidewalk the right to present a claim to
the city or town, (citations omitted). This duty seems generally
grounded upon the common law principal that one who has control
over a physical facility has an obligation to keep it in safe
condition (citations omitted).

16

Salt Lake County's request that the plain error exception be applied should be disregarded. In State v.
Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991), the court reviewed the doctrine of "plain error", stating, "[t]he first
requirement... is that the error be "plain," i.e., from our examination of the record, we must be able to say that it should
have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error
The second . . . requirement... is that the error affect
the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful." Id. at 922, (citation omitted). Despite its burden, Salt
Lake County has made no showing of either obvious error or that a substantial right has been adversely affected. Leigh
Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293,301 (Utah 1982). Salt Lake County's duty is the subject of settled case
law and was specifically acknowledged by Salt Lake County in the jury instructions it submitted or approved. No plain
error occurred.

29

Id at 161-62 (emphases added) .17
Salt Lake County's attempt to distinguish Trapp based upon Salt
Lake County's selective reference to a "redesign" is nonsensicle. Mr.
Hart's claim was not limited to negligence in failing to redesign. At
trial, Mr. Hart established that Salt Lake County was negligent as a
result of its failure to design, construct and maintain Wasatch
Boulevard in a safe condition, including its failure to provide an
adequate shoulder.

(R. 1139-40).

Moreover, Salt Lake County's

suggestion that it was unable to foresee and manage risk associated
with a defective highway is contrary to the evidence.

Unrebutted

evidence established Salt Lake County's awareness of numerous accidents
on Wasatch Boulevard (R. 1918-21, 1939) and of its construction project
prior to the accident to widen the highway.

(R. 1667-68).

Bruce

Reading testified it was fundamental in the highway design process to
anticipate potential obstacles and dangerous conditions in the road and
to construct an adequate escape route to allow motorists to avoid the
same.

(R. 1678-79).

He also testified that the standards of AASHTO

applied to Wasatch Boulevard.

(R. 1653).

The Trial Court committed no

error in concluding Salt Lake County owed Mr. Hart the referenced duty
of care.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING SALT
LAKE COUNTY'S UNTIMELY MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL FOR, INTER ALIA,
FAILING TO COMPLY WITH UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(c).
On February 1, 1995, Salt Lake County moved, pursuant to Rule
17

Caselaw cited by Salt Lake County in support of its application of the public duty doctrine are clearly
distinguishable as they involve a municipality's control of people, not physical facilities such as sidewalks, streets,
highways and related structures.
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59(a) (1), for a new trial.

Salt Lake County argued the Trial Court

abused its discretion in (i) permitting Mr. Hart's counsel to summarize
evidence of medical expenses and to generally refer to the fact and
nature of Mr. Hart's settlement with co-defendant Tweedy, and (ii) in
failing to instruct the jury on the comparative fault of Mr. Hart,
despite the admitted absence of any direct evidence of neglect on his
part.
On February 16, 1995, Mr. Hart objected to the motion given Salt
Lake County's failure to comply with Rule 59(c).

Utah R. Civ. P. 59(c)

mandates (emphasis added):
When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision
(a)(1) . . . , it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a
motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be
served with the motion. . . . The time within which the
affidavits . . . shall be served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. . . .
As properly determined by the Trial Court, Salt Lake County failed to
comply with the requirements of Rule 59(c).

(R.#1456).

No affidavit

was served or filed in support of Salt Lake County's Rule 59(a)(1)
request and a Rule 59(c) extension was not obtained.
In Thorley

v.

Kolob

Fish

And Game Club,

373 P.2d 574, 576 (Utah

1962) (emphasis added), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a denial of a
Rule 59(a) (1) motion stating,

,f

[t]he motion was properly denied by the

lower court because the appellants did not comply with Rule
filing the affidavit timely."
Maiben,

(Emphasis added).

652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982); Alpine
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See also
Credit

59(c) in

Burgess

Union

v.

v.

Moeller,

656 P.2d 988, 990 (Utah 1982).

Since Salt Lake County failed to submit the required evidentiary
support for its Rule 59(a)(1) challenge, the Trial Court properly
determined Salt Lake County's after-the-fact submission of evidence was
invalid.18

Given Salt Lake Countyfs noncompliance, Salt Lake Countyfs

its argument was not preserved on appeal.

Finally, Salt Lake County's

self-serving attempt, to now recharacterize its R59(a)(1) motion as a
U

R59(7)" [sic] motion should be disregarded.
K.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Permitting
Counsel To Generally Summarize Mr. Hart's Medical Expenses
And The General Nature Of Co-Defendants' Settlement.

Even assuming, the Trial Court improperly denied Salt Lake
County's motion, no abuse of discretion can be shown.

Utah courts

recognize that * [a] trial court's decisions regarding admission of
evidence are generally accorded a good deal of discretion . . . ."
Pasker,

Gould,

Ames & Weaver,

Inc.

v.

Morse,

887 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah

App. 1994). u[W]e review a trial court's determination that evidence is
not unfairly prejudicial under an abuse of discretion standard and
'reverse only if the ruling is beyond the bounds of reasonability.'"
Olympus

Hills

Center,

Ltd.

v.

Smith's

Food & Drug Centers,

Inc.,

889

P.2d 445, 455 (Utah App. 1994).
Salt Lake County contends that the Trial Court abused its
discretion by permitting Mr. Hart's counsel during uclosing" argument

Even if its Rule 59(a)(1) argument were properly before the Court, Salt Lake County nevertheless failed to
marshal the evidence. No direct or substantial evidence was introduced at trial that Mr. Hart was comparatively negligent
and reference to Mr. Hart's settlement with Tweedy was made only after consultation with, and express approval by, Judge
Medley both in chambers and in court.
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to reference expenses, Mr. Hart's settlement with co-defendant
Tweedy.19 Salt Lake County's argument ignores the Trial Court' specific
instructions.

Following Mr. Hart's closing argument, Salt Lake County

objected. (R. 2335-38).

In response, Mr. Schmutz noted his strict

compliance and stated:
I understood completely the issue that the court framed at the
beginning of the trial . . . that the amount of the damages could
not be discussed, but that beyond a specific discussion of the
amounts, there could be some reference made to the general range
or significance of the settlement . . . .
(R. 2336).

The Trial Court ruled, "Mr. Schmutz's closing argument on

that point was consistent with the evidence that was received . . . and
the court is not satisfied that the defendant is prejudiced by [his
argument]".

(R. 2337).

Salt Lake County's argument also disregards its own argument of
Mr. Hart's bias due to the Tweedy settlement.

During his opening

statement, Mr. Stone argued: "[The Tweedys] have been released out of
this lawsuit because they have reached a financial settlement. Mr.
Hart now has a financial interest and his sole motive in this case is
to blame this accident not on Tweedy but upon Salt Lake County."
1612).

(R.

This is like the pot calling the kettle black -- Salt Lake

County suggests Mr. Schmutz' summation inferred only nominal damages
were recovered from Mr. Tweedy(i.e., implying the jury should award
more than it might otherwise), yet in its opening argument, Salt Lake
County inferred that Mr. Hart was amply rewarded in the settlement and
19

Salt Lake County's reliance on King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975 (Utah 1988) is misplaced. Unlike the facts in
King, Mr. Schmutz' reference to medical evidence and settlement occurred during summation, not in the case in chief.
The reference was, accordingly, not evidence and fell clearly within the Trial Court's Jury Instruction No. 10.
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seeks a double recovery (i.e., implying the jury should not award
damages or less than it might otherwise). In light of the jury
instructions given regarding statements of counsel not being evidence
(R. 1088), the counterbalancing effect of these arguments, and the
attendant fairness in our system of advocacy, no harm can be said to
have occurred, as found by the Trial Court. (R. 2337) .
B.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Refusing To
Submit The Issue of Mr. Hart#s Comparative Fault To The Jury
And Salt Lake County Agreed To The Submission Of Mr. Hart's
Special Verdict Form.

Salt Lake County argues the Trial Court's failure to submit its
proposed special verdict form is reversible error.

However, Salt Lake

County ignores its in camera pretrial acquiescence, that no substantial
evidence existed to warrant including Mr. Hart on the verdict, and
disregards the absence of facts in the record.20

Moreover, despite

Salt Lake County's selective citation to the record, including the
Trial Court's conclusions regarding evidence at trial substantiates the
exclusion of Mr. Hart from the special verdict form.
Based upon a misleading citation to the record (R. 2371), Salt
Lake County suggests the Trial Court concurred with Mr. Postma's
recollection of an in camera pretrial conference dialogue concerning
jury instructions and the special verdict form.

Nothing could be

further from the truth! As the record reveals, Judge Medley was
actually being sarcastic with Mr. Postma for his "crystal clear

Notably, Salt Lake County's pretrial conference stipulation that Mr. Hart need not be included on the verdict
form consistent with its defense strategy. This Court will recall that on summary judgment and attest, Salt Lake County
contended Tweedy was the sole cause of the accident. {See Applt. Brief at 5).
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[memory] at this point" of the in camera discussion.

(R. 2371) .21 In

subsequent discussion between Mr. Schmutz and the Trial Court (R. 238486), Mr. Postma's stated recall was again found to be inaccurate
(emphasis added):
[Mr. Schmutz'] recitation of that event is more consistent with
this court' recollection and I am just going to be honest and up

front. I guess I wag a little putfrgifleby, as I indicated
earlier, foyl Mr f Postma's apparent crystal clear recollection of
something different. I just could not recall Salt Lake County
asserting their position that they thought the plaintiff should be
on the verdict form for comparative negligence purposes. I
thought it was almost acquiescence that there was no negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, consequently when I started seeing
these post trial motions come in, I was really surprised.
(R. 2386) .
Mindful that u[s]ubmitting the issue of contributory negligence to
a jury when there is no reasonable evidence in the record to support
this defense is reversible error and grounds for a new trial," the
Trial Court evidence, considered the in camera concession of counsel
and exercised its discretion in adopting a verdict form, which excluded
Mr. Hart.
1988).22
IV.

See Mikkelsen

v. Haslam,

764 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Utah App.

The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion.

THE DAMAGES CAP STATUTE VIOLATES MR. HART'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
BY LIMITING HIS RECOVERY $250,000.
Following a four-day jury trial, a $1.3 million verdict was

21

Even during this exchange, the Trial Court observed, "I am not sure Mr. Postma's recitation is accurate at this
point, but I do know for sure that I did not include the plaintiff on the Special Verdict Form because I didn't think that
there was evidence establishing . . . that the plaintiff was negligent." (R. 2371). In direct response to this statement, Salt
Lake County's counsel conceded, 'there wasn't direct testimony" of Mr. Hart's comparative fault. (R. 2371).
22

It must be noted that Salt Lake County voiced no objection during trial to the Trial Court's decision to submit
the special verdict form or to not submit any jury instruction on comparative fault.
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rendered in favor of Mr. Hart.

The jury concluded Mr. Hart was

entitled to recover $678,000 (51% x $1,330,000) in damages,
exclusive of interest, from Salt Lake County.

Notwithstanding

the jury's considered verdict, the Trial Court applied §#63-3034 ("Damages Cap Statute'') to limit Mr. Hartf s damages.
The Damages Cap Statute provides, in pertinent part:
(1)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if a judgment
for damages for personal injury against a governmental
entity, . . . exceeds $250,000 for one person in any one
occurrence, . . . the court shall reduce the judgment to
that amount.
§63-30-34(1) (a).

In limiting the amount of recovery available

to persons injured by reason of government misconduct to
$250,000, the Damages Cap Statute arbitrarily and
discriminatorily restricts the rights of seriously injured
persons, such as Mr. Hart.

The Utah Constitution guarantees Mr.

Hart's basic and important rights to recover for personal
injuries, to be treated equally under the law, to enjoy life,
and to seek full redress for his injuries in the Utah State
courts.

See Condemarin,

775 P.2d at 356 and cases cited

therein.23
Even assuming a rational-basis standard of review, which
Mr. Hart believes is too lenient given the "fundamental" or

23

See also Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661,669 (Utah 1984) (Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution
ensures that "persons similarly situated should be treated similarly") and cases cited therein.
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"important substantive" nature of his rights,24 the
discriminatory classification inherent in the Damages Cap
Statute neither is reasonable in light of any conceivable
legislative purpose (see also

discussion, infra,

Botts

v.

DeLand), nor does it bear a rational relationship to the
achievement of such a purpose.

This Court should declare the

Damages Cap Statute unconstitutional.
A.

If Applied, The Damages Cap Statute Would Violate The
Open Courts Clause of The Utah Constitution.

Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides,
" [a]11 courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury due
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy
by due course of law."

The Open Courts clause is primarily

concerned not with the preservation of particular, identifiable
causes of action as such; rather, it focuses on the availability
of legal remedies for those injured in their persons, property,
and reputations.
24

See Berry

v.

Beech

Aircraft

Corp.,

Ill

P.2d

The Condemarin Court defined a "fundamental" right as follows:
If the substantive right is deemed to be "fundamental," statutory restrictions will be
examined very closely under the strict scrutiny test; only the presence of a
compelling state interest will justify the restriction or denial of access to the courts.
If, on the other hand, the substantive right being asserted is not the subject of a
specific constitutional protection and is therefore not fundamental, then the rational
basis test provides that access to the courts may be restricted if a rational or
reasonable basis for the restriction is shown.

775 P.2d at 358 (emphasis added) (quoting Note, "Constitutional Law: Statutorily Required Mediation as a
Precondition to Lawsuit Denies Access to the Courts, 45 Mo. L. Rev. 316,319-20 (1980)). Although failing to
attribute "fundamental right" status to the Section 11 Open Courts analysis in the case, which arguably ignored its
own definition, the Court did acknowledge the "important substantive" nature of such rights in applying an
intermediate standard of review. Id. at 354 and 358. See also Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 359; Trujillo v. City of
Albuquerque, 798 P.2d 571, 577-78 (N.M. 1990) (op. w'drwn reh'g rem'd, 893 P.2d 1006 (N.M. 1995)) (right to
remedy for injuries was fundamental).
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670, 677 n.4 (Utah 1985)"(Section 11 protects remedies by due
course of law for injuries done to the substantive interests of
person, property, and reputation").
Berry

established a two-part test to be applied to

legislation that limits the availability of remedies:
(1) Does the law provide "an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy fby due course of law1" for the
restricted remedy imposed, and if not,
(2) Is the restrictive nature of the law justified by a
"clear social or economic" purpose and is the restriction
not an "arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the
objective"?
Id. at 680. The Utah Supreme Court has openly acknowledged that
"the right to be [compensated] for personal injuries" is an
"important substantive right" which is "in many cases
fundamental to the injured person1s physical well-being and
ability to continue to live a decent life."
P.2d at 360 (citations omitted).
to satisfy the Berry

Condemarin,

775

The Damages Cap Statute fails

test to the extent he falls within the

class of persons injured by a government tort-feasor and to the
extent his injuries exceed the statutory limit imposed such cap.
The injustice of placing the entire burden of protecting
the public treasury on a few individuals who suffer serious
injuries as a result of governmental negligence has generated
strong and well-reasoned opinions.
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The Condemarin

court stated:

Millions of healthcare consumers stand to gain from
whatever savings the limit produces. Yet, the entire
burden of paying for this benefit is concentrated on a
handful of badly injured victims--fewer than 15 in the year
MICRA was enacted. Although the Legislature normally
enjoys wide latitude in distributing the burdens of
personal injuries, the singling out of such a minuscule and
vulnerable group violates even the most undemanding
standard of under inclusiveness.
775 P.2d at 355 (quoting Fein

v.

Pejrmanente

Med.

Group,

665, 691-92 (Cal. 1985) (en banc) (citation omitted)).
discussion, infra

re:

Botts

v. DeLand.

695 P.2d

See

also

While reviewing the

Damages Cap Statute under an analogous equal protection
theory,25 Justice Stewart aptly observed:
The discriminatory classification imposed by the damages
cap unreasonably produces harsh results with respect to a
few people. That consequence of the statute is the
antithesis of equal protection of the law.
McCorvey

v.

Utah State

Dep't

of Transp.,

1993) (Stewart J., dissenting).

868 P.2d 41, 49 (Utah

Safeguarding the public

treasury cannot justify an erosion of Mr. Hartfs fundamental or
"important substantive" right absent a showing at minimum that
the legislative measure is reasonable and necessary.
B.

The Damages Cap Statute, On Its Face And As Applied By
Salt Lake County, Would Violate Constitutional Due
Process.

Since the Open Courts clause is "an extension of the due
process clause," Berry,

111 P.2d at 679, a substantive due

The natural overlap between Sections 11 (Open Courts), Section 7 (Due Process) and Section 24 (Equal
Protection) has been observed by the Utah Supreme Court. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 356-58.
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process analysis is often utilized in evaluating the
constitutionality of legislation that impairs a party's right to
a complete remedy for personal injuries.

In Condemarin,

for

example, Justices Durham and Zimmerman equated the two-part
Berry

test under the Open Courts clause as the appropriate due

process analysis where a remedy, that otherwise would be
available, is restricted by legislation.

See Condemarin,

775

P.2d at 357.
In this case, as recognized in

Condemarin:

the legislature has determined that the cost of protecting
the public treasury shall be borne by those few persons
most seriously injured by the negligence of government
. . . . [Having waived immunity], the legislature set out
to accord the victims of governmental tort-feasors the same
status as victims of private tort-feasors.
Id.

at 361 (emphasis added).

Similarly, the Damages Cap Statute

"severely restricts the right of every citizen to recover even
actual out-of-pocket losses [and] substantially infringes upon
those interests specifically protected by article 1, section
11."

Id.

at 368 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part).

Mr. Hart's constitutional right to due process does not
permit such a result.

The legislation fails to satisfy any

applicable standard of review.

Thus, this Court should also

strike the Damages Cap Statute down as unconstitutional under
Article 1, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution.
C.

The Damages Cap Statute, On Its Face And As Applied By
Salt Lake County, Violates Constitutional Equal
Protection.
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The Damages Cap Statute unreasonably operates in a
discriminatory fashion since it applies only to persons injured
by governmental entities £nd, as to those injured by
governmental entities, the statute discriminates between those
whose damages exceed $250,000 and those who suffer fewer
damages.

See McCorvey,

868 P.2d at 48-50 (Stewart, J.,

concurring and dissenting).

While Mr. Hart believes heightened

scrutiny applies, even assuming a rational basis review, such
classifications can be upheld only if (1) they are reasonable,
(2) they have "more than a speculative tendency to further the
legislative objective and, in fact, actually and substantially
further [] a valid legislative purpose," and (3) they are
reasonably necessary "to further a legitimate legislative goal."
Lee v. Gaufin,

867 P.2d 572, 583 (Utah 1993).

Here, even

assuming a rational-basis review, there is no legitimate or
rational purpose for the discriminatory legislation.

Even if

there were such a purpose, the Damages Cap Statute does not
rationally and reasonably advance any legitimate purpose.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
applicable whenever the state chooses to act. Thus,
whenever a state chooses to waive its sovereign immunity,
it must do so in a manner that does not irrationally

discriminate between classes of its citizens.
Greyhound

Food Mgmt.,

Inc.

1215 (S.D. Ohio 1986), aff'd

v. City

rem'd,

of Dayton,

653 F. Supp. 1207,

852 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1988)

(emphasis added) (statute precluding government claims by
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subrogated claimholders denied equal protection) aff'd on other
grounds. 852 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1988).26

The classification

between claimants with damages over $250,000 and those with
damages under $250,000 does not itself relate to the goal of
preserving public resources.

See id.

at 1214. Justice Stewart

appropriately observed:
Although the State clearly has the right, and even a duty,
to protect itself [and the state treasury] from such
liabilities [that might threaten the delivery of government
services], and although the damages cap is designed to
further that goal, it does so in such a marginal way as to
be unreasonable. Certainly one can kill a gnat with a
sledgehammer, but that does not make a sledgehammer a
reasonable means of killing gnats. The state has many
other reasonable ways to protect the treasury from an
unduly burdensome drain on it. The discriminatory
classification imposed by the damages cap unreasonably
produces harsh results with respect to a few people. That
consequence of the statute is the antithesis of equal
protection of the law.
McCorvey,

868 P.2d at 49 (Stewart, J., concurring and

dissenting) ,27
26

The equal protection analysis is not changed by the fact that there was no right to recover damages for injury
from the government until the state waived its immunity. It is the character of the right granted, as well as the manner in
which it is extended, not the date or grantor thereof, that gives rise to heightened scrutiny.
27

Justice Stewart continued, "the Legislature cannot grant [the privilege or right to sue the state] on any
condition that it wishes to impose
If the Legislature may impose any condition it chooses on a •privilege' that it may
grant or deny, such as business licenses, leases of state land, etc., then it could allow men to recover full damages from the
state for injuries arising out of negligent maintenance of the public highways, but allow women to recover only part of the
damages they suffer. The Legislature could also grant residents of only some counties the right to a full recovery and
deny that right to residents of other counties; and it could discriminate in granting a right to damages for injuries
negligently caused by the state on the basis of a plaintiffs age, ancestry, or employment." Id.
"The damages cap in this case invidiously discriminates against a few individuals who suffer devastating
injuries. The proposition that the state's ability to finance necessary or important functions would be jeopardized by
allowing full recovery does not justify the discrimination. The state has a number of other means for protecting the
treasury that do not require a few seriously injured persons to bear that entire financial burden." Id. at 50.
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Justice Stewartf s argument may have been the dissenting
opinion in McCorvey,

but, it now constitutes the unanimous

opinion of the Supreme Court as set forth in the recent case of
Bott v. DeLand,

922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996).

In Bott,

the Utah

Supreme Court adopted the essence of Justice Stewart's
reasoning, noting the absence of evidence that the statute's
purpose will be frustrated and the state's coffers will be
depleted by "making full retribution to the few prisoners who
will succeed in showing that
1

prison employees acted with

deliberate indifference1 or 'unnecessary abuse1 . . . ."

Id.

at 739.
Similarly, there is no evidence that the County's treasury
will be depleted by allowing a few motorists who have been
seriously injured by Salt Lake County's negligence to be fully
reimbursed for their damages; therefore, the Damages Cap Statute
should not be applied.
D.

If Applied, The Damages Cap Statute Would Violate Mr.
Hart's Inherent And Inalienable Constitutional Right
to Enjoy His Life.

The Utah Constitution states that " [a]11 men have the
inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives
and liberties". Utah Const. Art. I, § 1.

The Damages Cap

Statute infringes this fundamental right.
In Bott, 922 P.2d 732 and Ross v. Schackel,
(Utah 1996),

920 P.2d 1129

the Utah Supreme Court addressed constitutional

issues in relation to personal injuries suffered by two inmates.
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In Bott,

an inmate suffered injury stemming from negligent

medical treatment.

The inmate sued the government doctor and

medical technician that treated him and was awarded $4 90,000 in
damages.

The Trial Court reduced the recovery to $250,000. The

Utah Supreme Court reversed and held the Damages Cap Statute was
unconstitutional.

Bott,

at 739-40.

The unnecessary rigor clause of Art. I, §9 provides that
11

[p] ersons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with

unnecessary rigor."

While Mr. Hart cannot claim that he was

treated with unnecessary rigor, the essence of both the
unnecessary rigor clause and the right to enjoy life under Art.
I, § 1 are the same: They both guarantee a fundamental right to
enjoy one's life free of unnecessary abuse or injury.

See,

id.

at 734.
Bott recognized that a prison inmate is entitled to full
compensation for unnecessary abuse while in prison.

Mr. Hart

asserts that the same essential right should be accorded to non
prisoners pursuant to Art. I, §1. Mr. Hart's constitutional
right to enjoy his life is violated by the Damages Cap Statute.
It would, indeed, be ironic if a prison inmate has a
constitutional right for compensation to remedy abuse to his
life and that a non inmate could not have a corresponding
constitutional right intended to preserve essentially the same
fundamental right.
This conclusion is especially compelling in light of the
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fact that the perceived objective of the Damages Cap Statute
(protecting the public treasury from unreasonable depletion)
would not be frustrated by declaring the Damages Cap Statute an
impermissible infringement of Mr. Hart's Art. I, §1 rights. The
analysis in Bott applies:
"Our research reveals no sound evidence that making full
retribution to the few prisoners [or the few persons
seriously injured by Salt Lake County's negligence] who
will succeed in showing that prison employees [or County
employees] acted with *deliberate indifference' or
x
unnecessarily abuse', [or negligence in the present case]
. . . will deplete the state [or County] coffers. . . .
Imposing a statutory cap on damages is a crippling
regulation of prisoners' [or nonprisoners'] right to
recover under Article I, Section 9 [or Article I, Section
1], [citation omitted], and in light of the weakness of the
statutory objective of subsections 63-30-34 (1)(a) and (b),
we conclude that these subsections constitute an
unreasonable regulation of Bott's Article I, Section 9 [or
Hart's Article I, Section 1] rights."
Bott, at 739.
The Damages Cap Statute should be declared
unconstitutional.
E.

The Damages Cap Statute Violates Mr. Hart's
Constitutional Right To Trial By Jury, And Special Law
Clauses Of The Utah Constitution.

The Utah Constitution guarantees the right of a jury trial
in civil cases.28

^InternationalHarvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 418,421 (Utah 1981).
Other states with similar guarantees have held that this right includes the right to have the jury determine damages. See
e.g. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., 592 So. 2d 156, 162 (Ala. 1991); Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell,
757 P.2d 251,258-59 (Kan. 1988). In Moore, the court stated:
Because the statute caps the jury's verdict automatically and absolutely, the jury's function, to the extent the
verdict exceeds the damages ceiling, assumes less than an advisory status. This . . . is insufficient to satisfy the
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The Utah Constitution also forbids the legislature to enact
a "private or special law . . . where a general law can be
applicable."

Art. VI, § 26. A "special law" applies only "to

persons . . . though not particularized, [that] are separated by
any method of selection from the whole class to which the law
might, but for such legislation, be applied."
Ins.

Co. v.

Utah Ins.

Guar.

Ass'n,

Utah Farm Bureau

564 P.2d 751, 754 (Utah

1977).
V.

THE COURTS JUDGMENT SHOULD INCLUDE PREJUDGMENT AND
POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST.
A.

Salt Lake County Is Liable For Both Pre-judgment And
Postjudgment Interest.

Salt Lake County is required to pay prejudgment and
postjudgment interest just as any other liable party would.
Where a governmental entity waives immunity for a cause of
action, it also waives immunity from interest on a judgment for
that cause of action.

Dade County

v.

American

Re-Insurance

467 So.2d 414, 418 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1985); Carr v. State,

Co.,
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So.2d 1282, 1283 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1984).
In Utah, this waiver is not only implicit, but is expressly
waived by statute:
If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter,
consent to be sued is granted and liability of the entity
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.

mandates of [the constitutional right to a jury trial].
592 So.2d at 164. The analysis of the Moore court applies to this case.
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4(1)(b) (emphasis added).

Because a

private person sued for damages arising from personal injury is
liable for both prejudgment and postjudgment interest

pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-44 and 15-1-4, a governmental entity
is also liable for prejudgment and post judgment interest.
Therefore, Mr. Hart is entitled to prejudgment interest on
all "special damages actually incurred," Utah Code Ann. § 78-2744(1), as well as postjudgment interest on the judgment.
Code Ann. § 15-1-4(2).

Utah

And, for purposes of postjudgment

interest, the amount of the judgment includes the prejudgment
interest awarded.
McFarlane

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-44(2).

v. Winters,

See

also

201 P.2d 495, 496 (Utah 1949) (interest

due included as part of judgment for determining postjudgment
interest).
B.

The Statutory Cap Does Not Limit The Amount Of
Prejudgment Interest, Postjudgment Interest, Or Costs.

If constitutional, the $250,000 cap does not limit the
amount of prejudgment or postjudgment interest.

The Damages Cap

Statute only requires the court to reduce a "judgment for
damages for personal injury" to $250,000. Utah Code Ann. § 6330-34(1)(a) (emphasis added).29

It does not require the court

to reduce the amount of a "total judgment", or a "judgment for
damages" or even a "judgment" (any of which could, arguably,

In the present case, subsection (l)(a) is the operative section of the Damages Cap Statute because a judgment
was rendered in excess of $250,000 and the district court acted to reduce that judgment, as opposed to subsection (l)(b)
where the court would be awarding a judgment for injury or death.
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include prejudgment and postjudgment interest), to $250,000.
Only "damages for personal injury are reduced.
It cannot be argued that prejudgment and postjudgment
interest are included in "damages for personal injury."

Utah's

prejudgment interest statute recognizes that interest on a
judgment (even if construed to be a type of damage), is clearly
See Utah Code Ann.

distinct from "damage for personal injury."

§ 78-27-44(2)(b) (it is the duty of the court "in entering
judgment . . . to add [prejudgment interest] to the amount of
special damages actually incurred . . . "

(emphasis added)).

The

law also recognizes that postjudgment interest has nothing to do
Curtin

with damages for personal injury.
Highways,

v. Department

339 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Mich. App. 1983).

applies to costs.

of

State

The same analysis

Costs are "reimbursement of the expense of

litigating the claim" and have nothing to do with damages for
personal injury.

Lienhard

v. State,

431 N.W.2d 861, 864 (Minn.

1988) .
In light of this Courtf s duty to interpret statutory law
"according to its literal wording unless it is unreasonably
confused or inoperable,"

Gleave

v.

Denver

& R. G. W. R.R.,

749 P.2d 660, 672 (Utah App. 1988), cert, den.,
(Utah 1988),

Co.,

765 P.2d 1278

Utah's statutory scheme clearly limits only the

damages for personal injury, and not the separate elements of
prejudgment, postjudgment interest and costs, when such damages
exceed $250,000.
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Although no Utah case has addressed the application of the
Damages Cap Statute to interest on judgments.
Supreme Court has considered the issue.
Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania

Dept.

The Pennsylvania

In Woods v.

Of Transp.,

612 A.2d 970 (Pa.

1992), the court held that prejudgment interest (termed "delay
damages" in Pennsylvania) in a personal injury case against the
state cannot be limited by the $250,000 statutory damages cap in
Pennsylvania's Sovereign Immunity Act. Id at 971.
Interestingly, in cases where statutory damages caps have
been held to limit the amount of prejudgment interest, it is
because the wording limits prejudgment interest.
Wilmer

v.

Board

of County

Commissioners,

See, e.g.,

916 F. Supp. 1079, 1081

(D. Kan. 1996) (noting that Kansas1 damage cap statute expressly
limits the award of

prejudgment interest30) , and Huff

v.

State,

764 P.2d 183, 187 (Okl. 1988) ( denying prejudgment interest in
excess of statutory damages cap where statute limits the "total
liability of the state" [rather than a judgment for damages for
personal injury]).
Absent statutory language to the contrary, courts generally
hold that statutory damage caps do not limit postjudgment
interest.31

These authorities establish that the Trial Court

30

K.S.A. § 75-6105 (Kansas' damage cap statute states that "[a] governmental entity shall not be liable for...
interest prior to judgment.")
See, e.g., Wilmer, 916 F. Supp. at 1081 ("Court would not allow the County to avoid paying interest and costs
on the judgment, even in light of the statutory cap."); Montgomery Hosp. v. Medical Catastrophe Loss Fund, 668 A.2d
221,223 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (state is liable for postjudgment interest even though payment of such interest would require
state to pay in excess of statutory limit.), and Elmore County Comm 'n v. Ragona, 561 So.2d 1092,1095 (Ala. 1990) (state
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erred in applying the Damages Cap Statute to bar Mr. Hart from
recovering prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest and
costs.
CONCLUSION
To apply the Damages Cap Statute in this case and thereby
diminish the jury!s verdict in favor of Mr. Hart from $678,300
to $250,000 would violate substantial and fundamental rights
under the Utah Constitution.
Judgment should be entered in favor of the Plaintiff
against Salt Lake County in the full amount of the jury's
verdict of $678,300, together with pre- and post-judgment
interest.
DATED this ^7 day of December, 1996.
HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ,

P.C,

QjtfuuA
injury

:orneys for Plaintiff,
S. Hart

Richard

is liable for postjudgment interest to the same extent as any private judgment debtor and such interest is not subject to
statutory damage cap).
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